This reading emphasizes nefarious collusion between business and government, wherein public funds were unjustifiably and carelessly used to protect this insurance giant and its trading counterparties-mainly Wall Street investment banks-from insolvency and financial collapse. Of course, many other seemingly self-sufficient industries are also tainted with cronyism, having pursued lobbying and provided campaign funds on a similar scale, and having benefited grandly from government favoritism. 11 In 2014, the Senate Finance Committee approved corporate tax breaks totaling $48 billion. Yet there is always a back-story to apparent crony capitalism, making identifying true cronyism and estimating its economic cost less than straightforward.
First, the line between corrupt cronyism and legitimate bargaining among selfinterested parties in the halls of government is not always as brightly illuminated as in the sugar industry case. Second, although we can measure the costs to taxpayers of direct and even indirect subsidies, quantifying the cost of violations of the principle of equal treatment by government, the distortion of market mechanisms, and the undermining of public trust in government and business is vastly more difficult. For all these reasons, proving or disproving claims of cronyism-and the resulting blight on market-based capitalism and the public interest-can be a delicate and meticulous task. Part of the challenge is that "crony capitalism" has an insidiously corrupt sound. Standing alone, "crony" connotes a buddy, chum, or confidant. But when placed before "capitalism," "crony" takes on a more cunning and sinister tone implying accomplices, co-conspirators, or collaborators working together in an underhanded manner. Much of that connotation is correct.
David Stockman, former director of the Office of Management and Budget under
President Reagan, subsequent Wall Street banker, and a libertarian critic of contemporary capitalism, defines crony capitalism as "stealing through the public purse in ways that reward the super-rich." 12 Painting with a wide brush, he constructs a portrait of a class of Wall Street financiers and corporate CEOs who believe that government exists to do "whatever it takes to keep the game going and their stock price moving upward." 13 Charles Koch, the politically active CEO of Koch Industries, is similarly colorful in his definition, characterizing cronyism as "nothing more than welfare for the rich and powerful."
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As saucy as these definitions of crony capitalism may be, my goal is to add precision and nuance to our understanding of this form of corruption. I do so by exploring these definitions, the toolkit of crony capitalism, and ideas for curbing it. 12 Stockman offered this definition when discussing his book, The Great Deformation: The Corruption of Capitalism in America, at Harvard's Safra Center for Ethics on September 26, 2013. 13 Id.
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22 Recent approval of $150 million in federal loan guarantees for the Cape Wind project in Nantucket Sound suggests a strong policy interest in wind farming, even though the power generated in this project will be some of the most expensive in New England. Utilities NStar and National Grid have agreed to purchase 77.5 percent of the power from the project at a price well above typical wholesale prices. Cape Wind waited more than five years for this federal backing. Given the lengthy process for approving the project, the returns for Cape Wind investors must be high. Given the financial risks now borne by U.S. taxpayers, the public benefits Or consider the even more complex tax rule-some would say loophole-on "carried interest": the share of investment gains, typically 20 percent, that privateequity and hedge funds pay their general partners. The rule allows managers of these funds to defer federal taxes until profits are realized on their assets. At that point the gains are taxed at the capital gains rate of 15 percent, rather than the income tax rate, which could be 39.6 percent.
23
Some critics argue that carried interest should be taxed at the higher rate because these partners are basically earning a management fee for their labor. These critics also contend that this highly preferential tax rate-along with extensive borrowing based on cheap money and the short time horizons of executives-creates excessive risk-taking, and that the personal payoffs from taking outsized risks dwarf the costs of failure.
Critics also claim that the preferential tax rate leads to excessive compensation for executives, even though carried interest is paid only from a fund's profits.
Supporters of this tax regime counter that no one knows how much carried interest private-equity funds will pay, and that partners' compensation should be considered a return on a risky investment-that is, a true capital gain, not a management fee.
Which side is correct? The debate has continued in law journals, tax journals, and The complete history of the carried-interest rule (loophole) remains to be written.
But two things are clear. First, it's not only the amount of lobbying money that matters; it's also the quality of the lobbyists. Second, carried-interest rules favor high-net-worth individuals-a constituency that Congress listens to when raising campaign funds. 26 We shouldn't be surprised that this highly debatable tax preference has many of the markings of cronyism.
The Crony Capitalism Toolkit
As we have seen, business-friendly legislation and regulatory rule-making result from three potentially perverse relationships between business and government.
Although these relationships may be perfectly legal, they compose the crony The revolving door between business and government has the perverse effect of multiplying the ill effects of campaign contributions and lobbying, when continuous movement of employees between the public and private sectors leads to a shared ideology favoring business interests over the public interest. This phenomenon is referred to as "cultural capture" by James Kwak, a law professor at the University of Connecticut, and "regulatory capture" by economists before him.
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Corruption Based on Campaign Contributions
As a stand-alone tool in the cronyism kit, campaign contributions appear to be effective for "purchasing" business-friendly policies. The key word here is "appear,"
because precisely how specific campaign contributions influence specific public policies or pieces of legislation is often difficult to determine. One thing is clear, however: the sums flowing into the campaigns of congressional candidates from both parties are huge, and growing. As shown in An important source of these funds is interest groups that want something from government. Table 2 Opponents of this provision claimed that it "threatened the federal government's ability to regulate water use and maintain the health of the natural ecosystem."
Agricultural and recreation interests countered that they needed water rights to continue to operate. In Lessig's framework, the distraction, distortion, and distrust bred by our campaign finance system are as corrupting as the invisible links between this system and policy outcomes-both of which bend the government in the direction of major funders and against the interests of the people.
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What Former Members of Congress Actually Say
We know that the most practical way to capture the extent of corruption based on campaign funding is to pay attention to the testimonies of people who have lived inside the system. Most former members of Congress affirm that money matters a great deal in congressional affairs. "How could it not?" Lessig asks. There is another challenge we must address-and it is the corrupting force of the vast sums of money necessary to run for office. The unending chase for money, I believe, threatens to steal our democracy itself. I've used the word corrupting-and I mean by it not the corruption of individuals, but a corruption of a system itself that all of us are forced to participate in against our will. The alliance of money and the interests it represents, the access it affords those who have it at the expense of those who don't, the agenda it changes or sets by virtue of its power, is steadily silencing the voice of the vast majority of Americans who have a much harder time competing, or who can't compete at all.
The insidious intention of that money is to set the agenda, change the agenda, block the agenda, define the agenda of Washington. . . . This is what contributes to the justified anger of the American people. They know it. They know we know it. And yet nothing happens.
The truth requires that we call the corrosion of money in politics what it is: it is a form of corruption and it muzzles more Americans than it empowers, and it is an imbalance that the world has taught us can only sow the seeds of unrest.
Corruption Based on Lobbying
Lobbying Stanley, and Citigroup to compete with their foreign counterparts and pocket comparable gains from trading. However, it also exposes U.S. financial institutions based this finding on data from the Senate Office of Public Records. Companies must submit lobbying disclosure forms to the Senate database every quarter. However, the information is very basic. Respondents must indicate which area of the federal government they are lobbying and which lobbyists are involved, and indicate the issues involved only vaguely. Although this information precludes any real assessment of how much companies are paying a particular lobbying firm, it is better than nothing. A decade before Dodd-Frank, the business-led repeal of the Glass-Steagall Actwhich separated commercial and investment banks for nearly seven decades-was another case where lobbying and campaign contributions by the finance industry compromised the public interest. The repeal of Glass-Steagall-engineered by the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act-followed 25 years and $300 million worth of lobbying and campaign contributions by commercial banks seeking to merge with entities that trade securities. 57 The repeal was based on the argument that banks were now operating in financial markets where the distinctions between loans, securities, and deposits were no longer clear.
On the surface, that is true. However, the repeal of Glass-Steagall had the extraordinarily perverse effect of increasing risk in the global financial system and reducing its capacity to absorb unexpected shock. Federally insured banks were now free to merge into larger, more complex, and more leveraged institutions-the better to exploit greatly expanded profit opportunities in high-risk, high-return investment banking and securities trading. Commercial banks were also free to participate in the booming real estate market, by providing financing for mortgage brokers and issuers of mortgage-backed securities while also underwriting their The commodity futures legislation also contained a provision-heavily promoted by Enron, a generous contributor to Gramm-that exempted energy-linked financial products from regulatory oversight. 60 That enabled Enron to experiment, unfettered, with all sorts of financial instruments and derivatives contracts, many of which it eventually hid in off-balance-sheet entities when market values plunged.
Lobbying on the Affordable Care Act
Blocking new business-threatening rules and policies is, we have seen, just as important a lobbying mission as repealing existing policy. In the case of the showing that firms reap $6 to $20 for every $1 they spend on lobbying for targeted tax benefits.
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With respect to healthcare lobbying, Big Pharma reportedly spent $116 million on the aforementioned effort to keep Congress from authorizing Medicare to bargain down prescription drug prices. As a result, Big Pharma saved-according to United
Republic, a non-profit organized to end "money in politics corruption"-$90 billion in future profits, representing a return on investment of 77,500 percent.
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Corruption Based on the Revolving Door
The third item in the toolkit of crony capitalism, the revolving door between public service and the private sector, is also a potentially corrupting source of businessfriendly policies. "Revolvers" breed public distrust and anger when they ignore conflicts of interest when serving in government, and when they exert undue influence when representing business.
Calculating the number of people who pass through the revolving door is a daunting prospect, attempted so far only by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
That institution found that some 3,500 people moved from state and federal agencies regulating the banking industry to the private sector in 2013. 68 However, the revolving door actually includes several traffic flows. 66 Id., 117, note 83. Similarly, according to United Republic, a non-profit that uncovers the influence of wellfinanced interests in American politics, multinational companies spent $283 million on lobbying in 2004 for a tax break on repatriated profits, which they got. This tax break is worth $63 billion-again yielding a return on investment of 22,000 percent. The financial incentives to switch from government service to lobbying are steep.
Salaries for members of Congress have remained at $174,000 since 2009.
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Senate staff and legislative assistants earn a median pay of $30,000 and $35,000, respectively-significantly lower than Senate janitors and parking-lot attendants. 70 The average legislative counsel in the House made $56,000 in 2012.
In marked contrast, the average salary for lobbyists in Washington ranges from $68,000 for an assistant lobbyist to $133,000 for a senior one. 71 Salaries of lobbyists who are well-connected to members of Congress average $177,000, according to one study. 72 These are averages, of course, so the tail of this distribution is higher for more valuable lobbyists. If the consulting business is any guide, principals of lobbying firms take home many times those amounts.
Different studies of the gap in compensation for congressional employees versus lobbyists use different methodologies and come up with slightly different numbers. 73 But whatever the precise gap, it is significant. And given that staffers, especially, work for substandard wages, they clearly have real incentives to enter the revolving door after establishing "street cred." The industry with the most noticeable flow to government is finance. In the last 40 years alone, no fewer than 10 treasury secretaries have come from the business community-predominantly from Wall Street. Many of these appointees had been top-tier fund-raisers for the presidents they served.
Symptomatic of the flow of leaders from this industry to government is the roster of bankers from a single firm: Goldman Sachs. According to a Hunter Lewis, 5
Goldman employees spun through the reverse revolving door into the Clinton administration, 14 into the Bush administration, and 10 into the Obama administration. 88 For example, Gary Gensler, head of finance at Goldman, became 86 Id. At one level, the movement of extraordinary talent from Wall Street to government can be seen as a gift to the nation. However, its scale means that Wall Street's worldview inevitably spreads to the corridors of power.
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As in the case of Stephen Sayle, who has moved back and forth between the EPA and industry, Kaplan shows how the revolving door can spin in both directions.
While we do not know the precise size of this "round-tripping" cohort, the practice seems to be common in finance, healthcare, and chemicals, providing many opportunities for cronyism to take root. 
The Costs of Cronyism
We can crudely estimate many of the direct costs of crony capitalism, such as from targeted exemptions from legislation, advantageous rules by regulatory agencies, preferred access to credit, direct subsidies, preferential tariffs, tax breaks, and protection from prosecution. Other costs-including diminished public trust in democratic capitalism, and lower GNP growth because of a lower propensity of favored firms to make risky, transformational investments-defy systematic quantification, although they are arguably among the most important long-run costs of cronyism.
Imagine a system of tax breaks and subsidies that totaled $222.7 billion from 2008 to 2010, when the nation faced the steepest recession in more than 50 years.
Imagine also a system in which 56 percent of these subsidies went to just four industries: finance, utilities, telecommunications, and oil, gas, and pipelines.
Finally, imagine a system in which the most profitable industries receive the biggest subsidies. Your rich imagination might lead you to wonder about how such an arrangement could exist in our widely acclaimed democratic society. Your wonderment might turn to shock if you discovered that this imagined reality is, in fact, true-which it is, according to an analysis by Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy. corporate tax rate is nominally 35 percent, this amounts to a tax subsidy of about $34.5 billion. 93 And that figure does not include the bailouts by the federal government that kept large banks afloat during the recession. At least twenty other industries had effective tax rates below 20 percent as of January 2014, with effective tax rates in the single digits for many high tech industries. 94 The federal government spends almost $100 billion annually on direct and indirect subsidies to business, the Cato Institute recently reported, based on a detailed analysis of the federal budget. These subsidies include those for farms, small businesses, R&D, trade, and energy, railroad, and maritime interests, as well as tax preferences and favorable regulations. 95 Tax credits for the highly profitable oil and gas industry-which subsidize drilling costs and, oddly, compensate companies for the declining value of wells-total $7 billion a year, according to another recent estimate. 96 Former Texas governor and President George W. Bush provocatively commented that these subsidies have little justification. 98 Partly in response, leading
Republicans as well as Democrats are now beginning to signal-albeit in vague terms-that they could support a rollback of these credits. 99 How enduring that bipartisan sentiment might prove to be is highly questionable, however, given that the oil and gas industry spent about $70 million on congressional campaigns in 2012. 100 The industry also employed 737 lobbyists and spent about $140 million on lobbying-much of that aimed at heading off curbs on carbon emissions.
The costs of subsidies are equally shocking in other sectors. Recall the example of the sugar industry, whose political connections and lobbying ensure that U.S.
consumers pay prices 65-85 percent above those of the global market, yielding $3.7 billion annual subsidy.
The whiff of American-style crony capitalism is widespread, and growing recognition of its high costs forces the critical question of how we could contain it.
Containing Crony Capitalism
Crony capitalism is a two-sided transaction. 
